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Abstract
A ternary relation is often used nowadays to interpret an implica-
tion connective of a logic, a practice that became dominant in the se-
mantics of relevance logics. This paper examines two early manuscripts
— one by Routley, another by Meyer — in which they were developing
set-theoretic semantics for various relevance logics. A standard pre-
sentation of a ternary relational semantics for, let us say, the logic of
relevant implication R is quite illuminating, yet the invention of this
semantics was fraught with false starts. Meyer’s manuscript, in which
he builds on some ideas from Routley’s manuscript, essentially contains
a relational semantics for which R◦t is sound and complete.
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Introduction
It is now a routine part of the study of classical logic to recognize that there
are both proofs and models (interpretations), and that these are connected
by soundness and completeness. Soundness says that every provable for-
mula (theorem) is valid, i.e., true in every model, and completeness states
the converse. But it was not always routine. When Frege first presented
classical logic in his Begriffsschrift in 1879, he did it just by proofs, i.e., he
gave axioms together with rules for proving theorems from these. The inter-
pretations were lying there in the background, and for just the propositional
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logic (no quantifiers) they certainly could be seen to be made using Frege’s
two truth values, the True and the False. But it was not until Emil Post (in
1921) proved completeness for propositional logic that proofs and validity
came together.1
Modal logic was also just a set formulas with axioms, and rules for many
years before having a semantics. There was always the vague link between
the necessity/possibility operators and “possible worlds.” But Kripke [17]
“mathematized” these so as to give an account in terms of “frames” 〈K,R〉,
where K is a set of “worlds” and R is a binary relation of “relative pos-
sibility” on K. We put quotes around the key words, because in fact K
could be any set at all, and R could then be any relation on K, subject
to various formal requirements such as reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity,
just to name a few. Depending on the requirements, various modal logics
could be obtained. It is interesting that this “possible-world semantics” for
modal logic (as it is often called) is also frequently called the “Kripke se-
mantics.” In fact, a number of logicians independently developed similar
ideas, as documented by Copeland [5] and Goldblatt [16].
The so-called “Routley–Meyer semantics” for relevance logic has a sim-
ilar story, which has been told several times, often by one or more of us —
see Dunn [8], Anderson, Belnap and Dunn [1], Bimbo´ and Dunn [4]. Here we
will be focusing on two draft papers (never published). The first of these was
hand-written by Richard Routley, and titled “Semantical Analysis of Entail-
ment and Relevant Implication: I,” and dates from late 1970 or early 1971.2
The second of these was typed by Robert K. Meyer in response to Routley’s
paper and dates from early 1971. It was titled “Semantical Completeness
of Relevant Implication.”3 These papers have informally been referred to
as “Routley’s Dead Sea Scrolls,” and “From the Desk of Robert K. Meyer”
(that is what Meyer had typed in the upper right-hand corner).
1Though Zach [29] argues that completeness and some other results were first obtained
by D. Hilbert and P. Bernays in 1918.
2It is fair to say that Routley’s penmanship could have been improved, but it has been
carefully transcribed by one of us (NF). See Routley [24] and Routley [25].
Routley’s name was, well, “Routley” until he changed it to “Sylvan” in 1983. In this
paper, we shall refer to him as Routley, because the term “Routley–Meyer semantics” has
been chiseled in stone, so to speak.
3We are grateful to Alasdair Urquhart for giving us a scan of his copy of this document
which was sent to him by Routley. We also thank Michael McRobbie for a draft of a paper
written by Meyer in response to Routley’s draft paper, which Routley had sent to Meyer.
We also thank McRobbie for a copy of an incomplete draft of a paper by Meyer mentioned
in the next paragraph, which Meyer had presumably shared with Routley. McRobbie had
kept these from when he served as a research assistant to Routley.
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Meyer drafted at least the beginnings of another paper — probably,
in 1972 while on the faculty at the University of Toronto — focused on
developing an operational semantics for the negation-free fragment of R
(i.e., R+). The type-written copy we saw ends on p. 15 (in the middle of a
sentence), and p. 14 is missing. Although there are numerous citations and
numberings for endnotes, the bibliography and the endnotes themselves are
missing too. We do not know whether Meyer actually finished the paper
and we happened to just have part of it, but it seems likely to us that he
just set it aside at some point. There are many manuscripts by Meyer that
he never completed (and an amazing number of others that he did complete,
and publish).
We mention this paper so as to quote Meyer’s own impression of the in-
dependent contributions made by others towards the creation of the ternary
relational semantics for R.4
In the semantical analysis of R, two approaches have predomi-
nated. Urquhart in [4] takes off from the Anderson-Belnap nat-
ural deduction formulation of R in [5] and proposes a semilattice
semantics for the implicational fragment RI of R (and for re-
lated implicational logics).2 Routley and the author, on the other
hand, took essentially the algebraic analysis of R initiated by
Dunn in [6] as a starting point to develop a Kripke-style relational
semantics for R and related logics, in [7] and succeeding papers.3
Fine’s work in [8], though quite independent, contains some of
the features peculiar to each approach, though it is closer both in
spirit and technique to [7] than to [4]. In turn, the present essay
will more nearly resemble [8]; while neither the author nor Fine
has had much causal influence on the other, there is an evident
kinship in style of logical imagination. (I take the occasion to
express awe at the speed and precision with which Fine gets to
the heart of things; what he saw was that, in relevance logics,
it is the structuring of theories which is everything, a point that
Routley and I also drummed away on in [7], and which also plays
a crucial role below.)
What Meyer has been too generous to say is that the so-called “Routley–
Meyer semantics” is misnamed. Not because someone else anticipated the
general idea, but because Routley got it wrong, at least originally.5 Meyer
4The numbers in the quotation are as in the original typescript.
5Both of these might be true, see Dunn and Bimbo´ [4].
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is the first one to actually implement the ternary semantics and get com-
pleteness. It is of course more complicated than that (everything is), and
Routley did have the idea of the ternary semantics. But the Routley–Meyer
publications are the result of two drafts, one by Routley and the other by
Meyer. In the first the idea of ternary semantics is briefly mentioned, but
on a single page along with a binary operational semantics. It is the latter
that is pursued, and in the end does not work.6 Meyer is the one who took
up the idea of the ternary relational semantics and succeeded. Perhaps, it
should be called the “Meyer–Routley semantics for relevance logic”? We
do not want to push this, because the source of Meyer’s pursuit was that
half-page of Routley’s manuscript. In fact, the message we want to give,
and leave, is the fruitfulness of collaboration.
One of us (JMD) was a colleague of Meyer in the Department of Phi-
losophy at Indiana University, when Meyer received from Routley a copy
of his manuscript, early in 1971 (probably, January). Meyer and Dunn dis-
cussed the manuscript, which focused on the operational way of expressing
the semantics as we shall later discuss. Routley’s manuscript was ambitious.
Meyer told JMD at the time that Richard “claimed the waterfront.”7 Be-
sides presenting various versions of semantics for the propositional relevance
logics R and E and their variants, there was also a proposed semantics for
first-order variants, a proposed Gentzen system for R+, a section on de-
cidability, tableaux systems — the list goes on and on. The knowledgable
reader will realize that the first Gentzen system for R+ was created by Mints
[22] and Dunn [7] (not knowing of each other’s work) and that a whole range
of relevance logics (including R and E) were shown undecidable by Urquhart
[28]. Also in the listed “Contents” is a section on “Quantification,” but it
is not in the actual manuscript.8 Fine [15] showed that a constant domain
semantics (proposed by Routley and Meyer, Urquhart, and Fine himself)
was in fact incomplete.
6Fine [14] and Maksimova [18] independently (from each other, and from Routley
and Meyer) produced a variation of the Routley–Meyer semantics, which combines the
operational and relational approaches. KB and JMD discuss this in [4].
7This is a variant of the well-known phrase “covers the waterfront.” Meyer later used
this in his obituary of Routley, when he said “In philosophy Richard “covered the wa-
terfront,” tackling topics in (among others) logic, epistemology, metaphysics, ethics and
environmental philosophy.” (Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 4 (1998), p. 338)
8It is listed as on p. 95–96/68, but that is a “Covering Note” written by Routley and
is not an actual part of the manuscript itself.
The references to Routley’s manuscript include two page numbers separated by a slash.
The first number refers to the original handwritten manuscript [24], the second one refers
to the more easily accessible transcript [25].
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But getting back to the operational semantics, which is Routley’s point
of focus, Meyer and Dunn became aware of Urquhart’s so-called semi-lattice
semantics, developed about the same time. They came to realize it was
essentially the same as Routley’s operational semantics (see [4] for more
details, both historical and technical). Meyer and Dunn saw a comparison
to Urquhart’s semi-lattice semantics, which they had only recently become
aware of and already had shown to be incomplete. The problem was that
the following formula is valid in the operational semantics, but not provable
in R.9 (
(A → (B ∨ C)) ∧ (B → D))→ (A → (D ∨ C)).
It turns out (see below) that there is also a problem for soundness,
depending on how one treats the semantics of negation among the various
choices Routley presents. But that, we think, was not known to Meyer
who seized the opportunity to correct matters by using the ternary relation,
which was mentioned by Routley, even though he clearly favored the binary
operation. A binary operation is clearly a special case of a ternary relation,
but not the other way around.
It is worth remarking that Routley had as the very last leaf (p. 95–
96/68) of his manuscript what he labeled a “Covering Note” written by him
for those to whom he sent the manuscript.10 It starts: “There are several
gaps in the argument, and no doubt many invalid moves — I should be
grateful if you would point out all those you think I have failed to see.” He
then goes on to list eight “chief gaps & deficiencies.” We will talk about
some of these later, but for now we just want to comment on the courage and
openness that Routley showed in sharing his very original, but incomplete
thoughts. In particular, it left the door open for Meyer to come in and fix
some things.
1 Entailment and Relevant Implication
Routley had a very ambitious task when preparing his manuscript, namely,
he wanted to provide semantics for several logics in one fell swoop. His
manuscript is long and rich, and we will not try to work through all the
9Note though that it would be a theorem of R if one were to add C → C as an
additional conjunct in the antecedent. Incidentally, the counterexample can be simplified
to
(
(A → (B ∨ C)) ∧ (B → C))→ (A → C). Cf. [8, p. 196].
10We do not know exactly who was sent a copy other than Meyer and Urquhart. Dunn
was not, though he was able to read Meyer’s copy.
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ideas in it. Rather, we will focus on some semantics he proposed in the
manuscript and compare them to work done by Urquhart and Meyer for the
same logics — at around the same time.
To start with, we define the logics, which will be considered here, as
axiomatic systems. An axiom system, as a rule, is not unique for any given
logic. We aim to provide a concise formulation for R, from which some other
logics, R+, E and E+ result by omitting some axiom schemas. We will use
the same notation for all the logics, and we will not follow the notations
used by Routley or Meyer. We use → for implication, ∧ for conjunction, ∨
for disjunction and ∼ for negation, and we denote the (denumerably many)
propositional variables by p, q, r, p0, p1, . . . and the formulas by A,B, C, . . . .11
A1 A → A
A2 (A → B)→ ((C → A)→ (C → B))
A3 (A → (A → B))→ (A → B)
A4 (A → (B → C))→ (B → (A → C))
A5 (A → ((B → D)→ C))→ ((B → D)→ (A → C))
A6 (A ∧ B)→ A
A7 (A ∧ B)→ B
A8 ((C → A) ∧ (C → B))→ (C → (A ∧ B))
A9 (((A → A) ∧ (B → B))→ C)→ C
A10 A → (A ∨ B)
A11 A → (B ∨ A)
A12 ((A → C) ∧ (B → C))→ ((A ∨ B)→ C)
A13 (A ∧ (B ∨ C))→ ((A ∧ B) ∨ (A ∧ C))
A14 (A → ∼A)→ ∼A
A15 (A → ∼B)→ (B → ∼A)
A16 ∼∼A → A
11We assume familiarity with basic concepts such as well-formed formulas and proofs
in an axiomatic calculus, etc. See e.g., [8] or [2], and references therein.
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R1 A and A → B imply B
R2 A and B imply A ∧ B
Sometimes it is convenient (or outright useful) to have t (truth) and ◦
(fusion) in the logic too. To all the logics that we consider, these logical
particles may be added conservatively by some of the following axioms and
rules. When these particles are in the language, we will stress this by adding
t or ◦ (as appropriate) in the superscript in the label of the logic.
A17 (t→ t)→ t
A18 t
R3 If A is a theorem, then so is t→ A.
R4 If t→ A is a theorem, then so is A.
R5 If A → (B → C) is a theorem, then so is (A ◦ B)→ C.
R6 If (A ◦ B)→ C is a theorem, then so is A → (B → C).
Definition 1.1. The logic R comprises (A1)–(A16) and rules (R1)–(R2).
E is obtained by omitting (A4). The positive fragments of these logics, R+
and E+, respectively, omit (A14)–(A16). R∧→ and E∧→ exclude (A10)–(A13)
too. Rt and Et add axioms (A17)–(A18) and rules (R3)–(R4) to R and
E, repectively. The implicational fragments R→ and E→ are axiomatized
by (A1)–(A5), (R1), and by (A1)–(A3), (A5) and (R1). A logic with fusion
X◦ is the logic X with (R5)–(R6) added, where X is any of the previously
mentioned logics.
2 Routley’s “Dead Sea Scrolls”
The so-called semi-lattice or operational semantics was published in Urquhart
[27]. To anchor our subsequent discussion, we briefly recall this.
2.1 Urquhart’s Semantics for Some Fragments of E and R
Urquhart’s semi-lattice semantics for the implicational fragment R→ and
the positive fragment R+ of R is based on the idea of combining pieces of
information. One can combine any two pieces of information X and Y to
form the piece of information X∪Y , which contains the information in both
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X and Y . Moreover, according to his concept of “piece of information,” the
operation of combining information is idempotent, associative, and com-
mutative. The empty piece of information, denoted by 0, is included and
satisfies X ∪ 0 = X. That is, the set of pieces of information S containing 0
and closed under ∪ is a semi-lattice.
Furthermore, from each piece of information X there is a (possibly null)
set of atomic propositions that may be concluded. These are the atomic
propositions determined by X. A valuation is defined, which assigns to
each atomic proposition p and each piece of information X either T (if X
determines p) or F (if X does not determine p). That is, v(p,X) = T , if X
determined p, and v(p,X) = F , otherwise. For convenience, we will write
X, v  p in place of v(p,X) = T and X, v 2 p in place of v(p,X) = F . For
simplicity, we shall drop the v whenever doing so does not create ambiguity.
Definition 2.1. A model for R→ or R+ is a semi-lattice with 0 together
with a valuation extended to the appropriate connectives. The valuation is
defined for the formulas of R→ by conditions (CR1)–(CR2), and for R+ by
conditions (CR1)–(CR4).
CR1 X  p iff p is determined by X;
CR2 X  A → B iff for all Y , either Y 2 A or X ∪ Y  B;
CR3 X  A ∧ B iff X  A and X  B;
CR4 X  A ∨ B iff X  A or X  B.
Let L be R→ or R+; a formula A is L-valid when 0  A for every model
for L. As a result, a formula is valid if and only if it is a theorem of R→
(see [27, pp. 161–2]). However, while this semantics is sound for R+, it is
incomplete. The formula (already mentioned above) ((A → (B∨C))∧ (B →
D))→ (A → (D ∨ C)) is valid, but is not a theorem of R+.12
For the implicational and positive fragments of E, (E→ and E+, respec-
tively), a set of possible worlds is introduced. The set of worlds W , the
members of which will be denoted by w with or without a subscript, is or-
dered by a reflexive and transitive relation, denoted by ≤. The valuation
for atomic propositions is altered to v(p,X,wi) = T if p is determined by
the piece of information X, given the facts in world wi, and v(p,X,wi) = F ,
otherwise. Again, we will typically drop v, and use the convenient notation
X,wi  A.
12Urquhart credits this counterexample to Dunn and Meyer — see [27, p. 163].
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Definition 2.2. A model for L (where L is E→ or E+) is a semi-lattice
with 0, a set of possible worlds ordered by ≤, and a valuation extended to
the appropriate connectives. The valuation is defined for the formulas of
E→ by conditions (CE1)–(CE2), and for E+ by conditions (CE1)–(CE4).
CE1 X,wi  p iff p is determined by X, given the facts obtaining at
wi;
CE2 X,wi  A → B iff for all Y and for all wj such that wi ≤ wj ,
either Y,wj 2 A or X ∪ Y,wj  B;
CE3 X,wi  A ∧ B iff X,wi  A and X,wi  B;
CE4 X,wi  A ∨ B iff X,wi  A or X,wi  B.
A formula A is L-valid if and only if, for every model for L, 0, wi  A, for
every wi ∈W . As in the case of the fragments of R, the defined semantics is
sound and complete for E→. However, the semantics is sound but incomplete
for the positive fragment E+. Again, the formula we mentioned above serves
as a counterexample. Another formula that is also a counterexample is
((A → A) ∧ ((A ∧ B) → C) → (A → (B ∨ C))) → (A → C), which is
mentioned in [4, p. 573].
Urquhart discusses several attempts to deal with negation, each of which
fails. The first is to simply require that X  ∼A iff X 2 A. However, this
validates all instances of (B ∧ ∼B) → A and A → (B ∨ ∼B). The second
attempt is to add a function C to the semi-lattice and require that the
semi-lattice is closed under C, and furthermore, require that CCX = X
and C0 = 0 hold. The valuation for R or E is thus defined by adding a
condition (CRC) or (CEC) to the semantics for R+ or E+, respectively.
CRC X  ∼A iff CX 2 A;
CEC X,wi  ∼A iff CX,wi 2 A.
As a result, implication-free, two-valued tautologies, the laws of double
negation, and the De Morgan’s Laws are all valid. However, the formulas
(A → ∼A) → ∼A and (A → B) → (∼B → ∼A) are both invalid (see [27,
pp. 164–5]).
The final attempt at negation, which is particularly interesting for us,
because of its similarities to Routley’s treatment of negation, singles out an
arbitrary subset U of the semi-lattice for R and an arbitrary subset U of
S×W for E, and defines the valuation conditions for negation for R and E
by the appropriate condition below.
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CRU X  ∼A iff for all Y , either Y 2 A or X ∪ Y ∈ U ;
CEU X,wi  A iff for all Y and for all wj such that wi ≤ wj either
Y,wj 2 A or 〈X ∪ Y,wj〉 ∈ U .
The resulting semantics, however, invalidates some theorems of R and
E such as A∨∼A, A → ∼∼A and ∼(A∧B)→ ∼A∨∼B (see [27, p. 166]).
2.2 Positive Models
Routley’s models for E+ are similar to Urquhart’s with respect to the semi-
lattice structure with possible worlds. One notable difference is the defini-
tion of validity, but this definition turns out to be equivalent. The other
differences worth noting are the modifications to the semantics for R+.
Definition 2.3. A model for E+ is a structure M = 〈G,K,≤, 0, N, v〉 such
that 〈N,∪, 0〉 is a semi-lattice with lattice zero 0, K is a set of elements that
includes G, ≤ is a reflexive and transitive relation on K, and v is a valuation
function such that for every atomic formula p, every element α ∈ N , and
every H ∈ K, either v(p, α,H) = T or v(p, α,H) = F , but not both. We will
simplify this notation to v,H, α  p for v(p, α,H) = T and v,H, α 2 p for
v(p, α,H) = F , typically dropping v. Finally, v is extended to all formulas
by the following conditions.
EP1 H,α  A ∧ B iff H,α  A and H,α  B
EP2 H,α  A ∨ B iff H,α  A or H,α  B
EP3 Hi, α  A → B iff for every Hj ∈ K and every β ∈ N if Hi ≤ Hj
and Hj , β  A, then Hj , α ∪ β  B
Routley, unlike Urquhart, included the world G which may be thought
of as either some designated world or the “actual world” in that model. A
formula A is true in a model iff G, 0  A, and valid iff true in every model.
This definition is equivalent to Urquhart’s. If a formula is not valid on
Urquhart’s models, then there is a world in the model at which the formula
is not true (given the empty piece of information). To this model there
corresponds a Routley-model with that world being named G at which,
given 0, the formula is not true. The other direction is trivial.
To construct models for R+, Routley adds the following hereditariness
requirement to the E+-models.
If Hi, α  p and Hi ≤ Hj , then Hj , α  p, for every atomic
formula p, every α ∈ N and every Hi, Hj ∈ K.
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This requirement can be shown to extend to all formulas by a simple proof.
Thus, a major difference between Urquhart and Routley’s positive mod-
els is their treatment of R. It appears as if Urquhart had identified a mini-
mal structure to capture (via soundness but not completeness) the positive
fragment of R, and made the necessary modifications to capture E+. In
contrast, it appears that Routley’s semantic system was first constructed
for E+ and then modified minimally to provide soundness (but, again, not
completeness) for R+.
The manuscript contains a plethora of ideas concerning the treatment
of negation. This is surprising given that for many logicians (including us)
the most interesting part of the emergent joint Routley–Meyer semantics for
relevance logic has to do with relevant implication and the ternary accessi-
bility relation. Having briefly reviewed Routley’s positive models, we now
move on to the various attempts to model negation based on these positive
models.
2.3 Simplified Semantics for R
Routley’s simplified semantics for R are constructed by simplifying his
“Forced Negation Models.” After producing his positive models, Routley’s
first (in order of appearance in the manuscript) idea for the treatment of
negation is what he calls “Forced Negation Models.” These models will be
explicated in a later section. Here, however, the simplified semantics for R
are considered. For the simplified models, the semi-lattice structure with
lattice zero of the positive models is appended with an arbitrarily chosen
subset of the semi-lattice, and an interesting pair of conditions. The simpli-
fication refers to a lack of what we might call possible worlds. The resulting
structure is similar to Urquhart’s semi-lattice semantics with two excep-
tions. First, Routley’s condition for negation slightly differs from Urquhart’s
in that Routley’s arbitrarily chosen set P is the set theoretic complement
of Urquhart’s U . This will be shown in more detail below. The second is
the additional requirements Routley employs in his attempt to capture the
behavior of negation.
We leave the motivation and nature of the simplification to the section on
“Forced Negation Models,” where we will be able to consider both semantic
systems simultaneously.
Definition 2.4. A simplified R-model is a structure M = 〈0, N,∪, P, v〉
such that N is a semi-lattice under ∪ with lattice zero 0, P is a set of
elements of N , v is a valuation function such that, for every α ∈ N and
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every atomic formula p, v(p, α) = T or v(p, α) = F (but not both), and the
following conditions hold:
(i) If, for every β ∈ N , P (α∪β) materially implies P (γ∪β), then α = γ
(the simplified reduction requirement).
(ii) For every atomic p and every α ∈ N , if v(p, α) = F then for some
β ∈ N P (α∪β) (the simplified falsity requirement). [25, p. 22/14]
Again, let us employ our convenient notational shortcuts α  A and
α 2 A. The valuation function is extended as follows for the connectives ∧,
∼ and →:
(1) α  A ∧ B iff α  A and α  B;
(2) α  A → B iff for every β ∈ N , if β  A, then α ∪ β  B;
(3) α  ∼A iff for every β ∈ N , if P (α ∪ β), then β 2 A.
Truth in a model is defined as expected: a formula A is true in a simpli-
fied R-model when 0, v  A. A wff A is valid for the simplified R-models if
and only if it is true in every simplified R-model.
The difference between Routley and Urquhart’s valuation conditions for
negation are not significant. Given the same semi-lattice structure, we may
define P = S−U . Doing so results in the equivalence between the valuation
conditions, for Urquhart’s condition is already equivalent to “X  ∼A iff
for all Y , X ∪Y /∈ U implies Y 2 A.” By replacing S−U with P , Routley’s
condition results. Both conditions correspond to defining negation via A→
f , but differ on whether to notationally privilege the elements of the semi-
lattice corresponding to f or to its set theoretic complement.
By selectively reducing the simplified R-models to smaller sets of con-
nectives, we can define semantics for various fragments of R. As the se-
mantics are identical to Urquhart’s with the exception of the treatment of
negation, the semantics for the positive fragments of R are sound for their
respective fragments. Furthermore, a completeness proof is possible for the
implicational fragment along the lines of Urquhart’s proof in [27]. Given the
similarities in the treatment of negation, the following lemma also follows.
Lemma 2.5. All instances of the axiom schemas (A → ∼A) → ∼A and
(A → ∼B)→ (B → ∼A) are valid in the simplified R-models.
Proof. One should be fairly convinced that the similarities to Urquhart’s
semi-lattice semantics with the exception of negation ensure that the axioms
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that do not contain disjunction or negation are valid. The interesting cases
are those of negation, since Routley’s semantics includes the falsity and
reduction requirements. We shall demonstrate that axioms (A14)–(A15) of
R are valid.
1. Axiom (A → ∼A)→ ∼A.
Assume for reductio that there is a simplified model wherein 0 2 (A →
∼A) → ∼A. It follows from the truth condition for implication that there
is a β such that β  A → ∼A, but β 2 ∼A (for β ∪ 0 = β). From the
latter, we can infer that there is a γ such that γ  A and P (β ∪ γ). From
β  A → ∼A, γ  A, and the truth condition for implication, it follows that
β ∪ γ  ∼A. Because of the properties of ∪, it follows from P (β ∪ γ) that
P ((β ∪ γ) ∪ γ). From this last fact, the truth condition for negation, and
β ∪ γ  ∼A, it follows that γ 2 A, which contradicts our first inferred fact
about γ.
2. Axiom (A → ∼B)→ (B → ∼A).
Assume for reductio that 0 2 ((A → ∼B) → (B → ∼A)). From the truth
condition for implication, we get that there is an α such that α  (A → ∼B),
but α 2 (B → ∼A). From the latter, it follows that there is a β such that
β  B, but α ∪ β 2 ∼A. From the latter, it follows that there is a γ such
that P ((α ∪ β) ∪ γ) and γ  A. However, given α  (A → ∼B), γ  A and
the truth condition for implication, we can infer that α∪γ  ∼B. From this
last fact, the truth condition for negation, and P ((α∪γ)∪β) it follows that
β 2 B, which contradicts the first inferred fact about β.
The falsity and reduction requirements are not used in the above proof.
Given the falsity and reduction requirements, it might be conjectured that
Routley’s semantics is sound for R. Unfortunately, a counter-model to the
last negation axiom ∼∼A → A is possible. To construct a counter-model for
this axiom, first we need to construct a semi-lattice semantics that adheres
to the conditions set out by Routley.
One possible simplified R-model is the infinite join-semi-lattice N∞ in
Figure 1 — with any valuation for the atomic formulas — as we explain
below.
1. We note that the labeling on the left indicates that all the elements
on the level are in P or are not in P (when the label is ¬P ). P and ¬P
continue to alternate between the levels. Given this, (ii) from Definition 2.4
is obviously satisfied — no matter what the valuation is — because for any
element α there is another element β such that α ≤ β and P (β), hence,
P (α ∪ β) too.
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Figure 1: The infinite diamond N∞
2. Now we show that (i) is also true. Our strategy is to show that if a pair
of elements α, γ are distinct in the semi-lattice (as suggested by the Hasse
diagram in Figure 1), then there is an element β with P (α ∪ β) true but
P (γ ∪ β) false. We consider two cases depending on whether x and y are
comparable with respect to ≤ or not.
2.1 Let x and y be incomparable, that is, neither x ≤ y nor y ≤ x holds.
Although x and y may not be on the same level, if x∪y is on level n+1 and
P (x∪y), then there are elements x′ and y′ that are on level n, x′∪y′ = x∪y
and x ≤ x′ and y ≤ y′. This means that we may concentrate on the latter
pair of elements (which are like d and c in the diagram). We note that x′
and y′ are also incomparable, and each has another element (beyond x′∪y′)
immediately above it that is in P . Let us assume that these are x′′ and
y′′. Then, P (x ∪ y′′) is false, while P (x ∪ x′′) is true; switching x and y
throughout P (y ∪ x′′) is false and P (y ∪ y′′) holds. This shows that x and y
are distinct under the simplified reduction principle. This argument appeals
only to properties of join elements, and the fact that each element has two
elements immediately above it, which implies that if P (x ∪ y) is false, then
a permutation of x′′ and y′′ yields the desired conclusion.
2.2 Let us assume that x and y are comparable, but distinct. Then, without
loss of generality, we can take x ≤ y to be the case. Again, there is a
symmetry between P and ¬P , hence, we only consider the former in detail.
Let x ∪ y ∈ P and y ∈ P . Since the elements are distinct, x /∈ P
may be the case. If the difference between y and x is more than one level
(`(x) + 1 < `(y)), then there is an x′ immediately below y. Let x ≤ x′ ≤ y
be the case, where `(x′) + 1 = `(y), hence, x′ /∈ P . Then P (y ∪ x′) but
P (x ∪ x′) fails. By the construction of the semi-lattice, there is a y′ such
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that x′ ≤ y′, `(y) = `(y′) but y 6= y′. Then P (x∪y′) but not P (y∪y′). This
completes our proof that N∞ is a simplified structure for R.
3. The infinite semi-lattice N∞ above is a join-semi-lattice with lattice 0.
It satisfies the simplified reduction requirement, and the falsity requirement
— as we showed above. To create a counter-model to ∼∼A → A using this
semi-lattice, let x  q if x ∈ P and x 2 q if x /∈ P . As a result, 0 2 q.
However, it follows from the above stipulations that, for every element z of
the semi-lattice, z 2 ∼q. That is, for every element z, there is an element
w such that P (z ∪ w), z ∪ w = w and w  q. This is ensured by the fact
that there is always a “higher” element in the semi-lattice in the set P ,
and the fact that elements in the set P make q true (i.e., for all w ∈ P ,
w  q). It follows from the fact that every element z is such that z 2 ∼q
that 0  ∼∼q. Given that both 0  ∼∼q and 0 2 q, this simplified R-model
is a counter-example to the axiom ∼∼A → A, which demonstrates that
Routley’s simplified R-models are not models of R.
Overall, the implicational fragment R→ is sound and complete for Rout-
ley’s simplified semantics, and the positive fragment R+ is sound for it. The
falsity and reduction requirements were insufficient to produce models for
R. Thus, we may add Routley’s attempt at negation to Urquhart’s list of
failed attempts at treating negation in the semi-lattice semantics of R.
2.4 Forced Negation Models
Routley’s “Forced Negation Models” take the rich framework of the posi-
tive models and, in an attempt to model negation, add a relation between
elements of the semi-lattice and what can be called possible worlds. This
relation is used in the treatment of negation. Again, we will conveniently
write Hi, α  A and Hi, α 2 A in place of Routley’s v(A, α,Hi) = T and
v(A, α,Hi) = F , respectively. According to Routley, the valuation condition
for disjunction on these models is quite interesting, although the proof of
this fact supposedly contains an erroneous use of the reduction requirement
for these models.
Definition 2.6. A forced negation model for R is a structureM = 〈G,K,≤,
0, N, P, v〉, where K is a set of elements including G, ≤ is a reflexive and
transitive relation on K, 〈N, 0〉 is a semi-lattice with join operation denoted
by ∪, and with lattice zero 0. v is a function such that for every atomic p
and every α ∈ N and Hi ∈ K, either Hi, α  p or Hi, α 2 p, and P ⊆ N ×K
such that the following requirements are satisfied:
1 If, for every β ∈ N and H ∈ K, H1 ≤ H and P (α ∪ β,H) imply
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H ≤ H2 and P (γ ∪ β,H2), then (α,H1) = (γ,H2);
2 if H1, α  p and H1 ≤ H2, then H2, α  p, for every atomic formula
p, every α ∈ N and every H1, H2 ∈ K;
3 for every atomic p, every α ∈ N and every H1 ∈ K, if H1, α 2 p,
then for some β and H2 both H1 ≤ H2 and P (α ∪ β,H2).
The requirements are named, respectively, the reduction requirement (1),
the hereditariness requirement (2), and the falsity requirement (3). Finally,
the valuation v is extended to ∧,→, and ∼ as follows:
FN1 H,α  A ∧ B iff H,α  A and H,α  B;
FN2 Hi, α  A → B iff for every Hj ∈ K and β ∈ N , if Hi ≤ Hj and
Hj , β  A then Hj , α ∪ β  B;
FN3 Hi, α  ∼A iff for every Hj ∈ K and β ∈ N , if Hi ≤ Hj and
P (α ∪ β,Hj) then Hj , β 2 A.
A formula A is true in the forced negation model M iff G, 0  A. A
formula is (forced-negation-)valid iff it is true in every forced negation model.
In these models, Routley treats disjunction as a defined connective via
its usual definition using conjunction and negation. The valuation condi-
tion stated by Routley for disjunction is not what one would expect. The
statement of the condition is split into two. The first is not very surprising.
FN4.1 If H,α  A or H,α  B, then H,α  A ∨ B.
However, the second half includes an unexpected proviso.
FN4.2 If H,α  A ∨ B, then H,α  A or H,α  B, provided that for
some formula C and some β ∈ N , H,α ∪ β 2 C.
This surprising proviso allows for an application of the falsity require-
ment in the proof; however, the reduction requirement is incorrectly applied
in the proof attempt. This pair of valuation conditions for defined disjunc-
tion has not been proven to work. In fact, it appears unlikely such a proof
is possible.
Routley’s simplified models for R are constructed by modifying the
forced negation models to eliminate the possible worlds. However, at the
end of the manuscript, in his “Covering Note,” Routley points out that
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All of my “proofs” that simplified models will work for R have
broken down. [24, p. 95/69]
However, Routley does not indicate where or why the so-called “proofs”
break down. In Section 2.3, the simplified models are shown by us to be
unsound for the logic R. In particular, ∼∼A → A is not valid on the
simplified models.
Routley uses a key lemma to demonstrate the redundancy of the possible
worlds and motivate a move from the forced negation models to the simpli-
fied models for R. Routley provides a brief sketch of this proof in which he
claims that both the falsity and reduction requirements are used essentially.
In this lemma, he states, among another things, that on the forced negation
models:
For every H ∈ K, v(A,α,H) = v(∼∼A,α,H).
That is, H,α  A iff H,α  ∼∼A. However, in our proof of the inade-
quacy of the simplified models, the counter-model to ∼∼A → A shows that
α  A iff α  ∼∼A is not the case for the simplified models as defined.
This leaves open two possibilities. Either Routley’s error lies in this
motivating lemma, or it lies in the forced negation models themselves. As
will be demonstrated below, Routley’s forced negation models fail to vali-
date ∼∼A → A. The counter-example is similar to the model we used to
demonstrate the inadequacy of the simplified models, for it uses the same
semi-lattice structure.
Routley’s forced negation models do not validate ∼∼A → A. The
counter-example we will consider merely adds a single possible world, G,
to the counter-model for the simplified models in Section 2.3, with the ap-
propriate changes to deal with such an addition.
Consider the infinite semi-lattice N∞ in Figure 1. Let K contain only
the member G, and let P (α,G) iff α is an element of the semi-lattice labeled
as P . The hereditariness requirement is trivially satisfied. To see that the
reduction and falsity requirements are satisfied, the reader is encouraged
to modify the relevant proofs in Section 2.3 with the addition of the single
world G.
Finally, let G,α  q if G,α ∈ P and G,α 2 q if G,α /∈ P . As a result,
G, 0 2 q. However, it follows from the above stipulations that, for every
element β of the semi-lattice, G, β 2 ∼q, because there is always another
element γ such that P (β ∪ γ,G) and G, γ  q. This is ensured by the fact
that there is always a ‘higher’ element in the semi-lattice in the set P , and
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the fact that elements in the set P make q true. It follows from the fact
that every element β is such that G, β 2 ∼q that G, 0  ∼∼q.
Given that both G, 0  ∼∼q and G, 0 2 q, this forced negation model is
a counter-example to the axiom ∼∼A → A, which demonstrates that the
forced negation models are unsound for R, and indeed every logic with this
axiom.
Thus, Routley’s error lies in the forced negation models, wherein∼∼A →
A is invalid. This is somewhat to be expected, as the treatment of negation
in the models is similar to defined ∼A as A → f , a fact, which Routley
highlighted. He claimed that defining negation via f and f via “H,α 2 f
iff P (α,H)” [24]. In other words, the pairs in P could be thought of as
consistent in the respect that they do not make the falsity constant f true.
Given that neither the simplified models nor the forced negation models
validate ∼∼A → A, we are left to wonder why Routley recognized the failure
of his “proofs” with respect to the simplified models, but not the forced
negation models. However, Routley’s ideas concerning the forced negation
models are illuminating. The unexpected valuation condition for disjunction
appears to indicate that Routley anticipated problems with the semantics
for fragments of R that include disjunction. Additionally, the reduction and
falsity requirements are used in this section sparingly. Both are used in the
failed proof for the valuation condition for disjunction, and the reduction
requirement is suggested to be used non-essentially in a proof that the falsity
requirement applies to all formulas. Finally, both requirements are cited in
the failed “proof” motivating the simplified semantics.
2.5 Direct Negation Models
Another of Routley’s ideas concerning the treatment of negation is what
he called the “Direct Negation Models.” In these models we find the same
semi-lattice structure with lattice zero. However, the possible-worlds are
enriched to produce models for negation. Two novel ideas are combined in
these models. The first is the introduction of worlds at which implicational
formulas are given arbitrary truth values. We could call these non-normal
worlds, the abnormality following only from their valuation of conditionals.
While Routley does not use the term “non-normal,” we will do so here for
easy reference. The second idea is the pairing of each possible world with a
unique non-normal world. By combining these two ideas, the models that
result are sound for the logic E.
Definition 2.7. A direct negation model for E is a structureM = 〈G,K,≤,
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0, N,∪, v〉, where as before, 〈N,∪, 0〉 is a semi-lattice with lattice zero 0, K
is a set of elements, G ∈ K, and following conditions hold:
(1) For each Hi ∈ K, there is a unique Ji ∈ K;
(2) ≤ is a transitive and reflexive relation on M = {Hi : hi ∈ K };
(3) G = H0 (i.e., G ∈M);
(4) for every α ∈ N and Hi and Ji ∈ K, v assigns either T or F to each
atomic proposition (as before);
(5) for every α ∈ N and Ji ∈ K, v assigns either T or F to each
implicational formula.
We will keep to Routley’s notation and use I, I1, I2, . . . In, . . . as variables
ranging over the elements of K.
Definition 2.8. The valuation v is extended as follows:
DN1 I, α  A ∧ B iff I, α  A and I, α  B;
DN2 I, α  A ∨ B iff I, α  A or I, α  B;
DN3 Hi, α  ∼A iff Ji, α 2 A;
DN4 Ji, α  ∼A iff Hi, α 2 A;
DN5.1 if Hi, α  A → B, then for every β ∈ N and Hj ∈ K, if Hi ≤ Hj ,
then
(i) if Hj , β  A then Hj , α ∪ β  B, and
(ii) if Jj , α ∪ β  A then Jj , β  B;
DN5.2 if Hi, α  A → B and Hi, α,2 B, then Hi, α 2 A;
DN6 if Hi, α 2 A → B, then for some β ∈ N and some Hj ∈ K,
Hi ≤ Hj and Hj , β  A and Hj , α∪ β 2 B, and Jj , α∪ β  A and
Jj , β 2 B.
The condition DN5.2 is intended to replace the reduction requirement,
and DN5.1 is intended to capture contraposition principles. The condition
DN6 results from simplifying Routley’s original condition in a way suggested
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in the manuscript. (Originally, the final clause used a bound γ instead of
β.)13
A formula A is true in a model if and only if G, 0  A. A formula is
valid when it is true in all direct negation models.
To create models for the logic R, the following two modifications must
be made.
1 ≤ is extended from M to all of K by setting J1 ≤ J2 iff H2 ≤ H1.
2 If Ii, α  A and Ii ≤ Ij , then Ij , α  A for every atomic formula
for every α and Ii, Ij ∈ K and for every entailment for every α and
Ji, Jj ∈ K.
This second requirement, the hereditariness requirement, can be shown
to extend to all formulas A, having been defined here for every initial case.
Again, truth and validity are defined as expected.
Interestingly, the axioms for negation for E, and thus also for R, are
valid on these direct negation models.
Lemma 2.9. The axioms (A → ∼A)→ ∼A and (A → ∼B)→ (B → ∼A),
and ∼∼A → A are valid on the direct negation models.
Proof. 1. Axiom (A → ∼A)→ ∼A.
Assume for reductio that there is a directed negation model wherein G, 0 2
(A → ∼A) → ∼A. From condition DN6, it follows that there is an α ∈ N
and Hi ∈ K such that G ≤ Hi and Hi, α  A → ∼A, Hi, α 2 ∼A, Ji, α 
A → ∼A, and finally Ji, α 2 ∼A. From the last fact and DN4, it follows
that Hi, α  A. However, it follows from Hi, α  A → ∼A and Hi, α 2 ∼A
that Hi, α 2 A, which gives us our required contradiction.
2. Axiom (A → ∼B)→ (B → ∼A).
Suppose for reductio that for some model we have G, 0 2 (A → ∼B) →
(B → ∼A). It follows that there is an α and Hi such that G ≤ Hi, Hi, α 
(A → ∼B), and Hi, α 2 (B → ∼A). From Hi, α 2 (B → ∼A) and DN6 we
get that there is a β and Hj such that Hi ≤ Hj , Hj , β  B, Hj , α∪ β 2 ∼A,
Jj , α ∪ β  B, and Jj , β 2 ∼A. From Hj , α ∪ β 2 ∼A and DN3 it follows
that Jj , α∪β  A. With Hi, α  (B → ∼A) and Hi ≤ Hj and Jj , α∪β  A,
it follows by DN5.2 that Jj , β  ∼B. From this last fact and DN4 we get
Hj , β 2 B, which gives us our required contradiction.
13One of us (NF) may have done more simplifying here than suggested by Routley.
However, such simplification appears necessary for the proofs below. The last part of
DN6 before simplification uses Jk and γ instead of Jj and β.
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3. Axiom ∼∼A → A.
Suppose for reductio that G, 0 2 ∼∼A → A. It follows that there is a β
and Hj such that G ≤ Hj , Hj , β  ∼∼A, but Hj , β 2 A. By DN3 and
Hj , β  ∼∼A, we get that Jj , β 2 ∼A. From this last fact and DN it follows
that Hj , β  A, which gives us our required contradiction.
Theorem 2.10. The logic E is sound for the direct negation models.
Proof. Axioms (A14)–(A16) are covered by the previous lemma. The proof
for the remaining axioms is quite lengthy. However, it makes no use of either
the J-worlds or the arbitrary valuations of entailments at J-worlds.
1. Axiom A → A.
Suppose for reductio that G, 0 2 A → A. Then there is a β and Hi such
that Hi, β  A and Hi, β 2 A, a contradiction.
2. Axiom (A → B)→ ((C → A)→ (C → B)).
Suppose for reductio that G, 0 2 (A → B) → ((C → A) → (C → B)). It
follows that there is an α and Hi such that G ≤ Hi and Hi, α  A → B and
Hi, α 2 (C → A) → (C → B). From the latter it follows that there is a β
and Hj such that Hi ≤ Hj and Hj , β  C → A, but Hj , α ∪ β 2 C → B.
From the latter again we get that there is γ and Hk such that Hj ≤ Hk,
Hk, γ  C, and Hk, α ∪ β ∪ γ 2 B. Using DN5.1, Hj , β  C → A, Hj ≤ Hk,
and Hk, γ  C, it follows that Hk, β ∪ γ  A. By a similar argument from
Hi, α  A → B and the transitivity of ≤, it follows that Hk, α ∪ β ∪ γ  B,
which gives us our contradiction.
3. Axiom (A → (A → B))→ (A → B).
Suppose for reductio that G, 0 2 (A → (A → B))→ (A → B). Then there is
an α and Hi such that G ≤ Hi, Hi, α  A → (A → B), but Hi, α 2 A → B.
From the latter we get that there is a β andHj such thatHi ≤ Hj , Hj , β  A,
and Hj , α ∪ β 2 B. From Hj , β  A, Hi, α  A → (A → B), and Hi ≤ Hj
it follows that Hj , α ∪ β  A → B. The last fact, the reflexivity of ≤ and
idempotence of ∪ and Hj , β  A with DN5.1 imply that Hj , α ∪ β  B,
which gives us our contradiction.
4. Axiom (A → ((B → D)→ C))→ ((B → D)→ (A → C)).
Suppose for reductio that G, 0 2 (A → ((B → D) → C)) → ((B → D) →
(A → C)). Then there is an α and Hi such that G ≤ Hi, and Hi, α 
A → ((B → D) → C) but Hi, α 2 (B → D) → (A → C). From the
latter, there is a β and Hj such that Hi ≤ Hj , Hj , β  B → D, and
Hj , α ∪ β 2 A → C. From the latter, it follows that there is a γ and Hk
such that Hj ≤ Hk, Hk, γ  A, and Hk, γ ∪ α ∪ β 2 C. From Hk, γ  A,
the transitivity of ≤ and Hi, α  A → ((B → D)→ C), it follows by DN5.1
Australasian Journal of Logic (15:2) 2018, Article no. 3.2
192
that Hk, α∪γ  (B → D)→ C. Similarly, applying DN5.1 again we get that
Hk, α ∪ β ∪ γ  C, which gives us our desired contradiction.
5. Axiom (A ∧ B)→ A.
Suppose for reductio that G, 0 2 (A ∧ B) → A. Then there is an α and Hi
such that G ≤ Hi, Hi, α  A ∧ B, and Hi, α 2 A. However, from DN1 we
get that Hi, α, A, a contradiction.
6. Axiom (A ∧ B)→ B.
Similar to previous case.
7. Axiom ((C → A) ∧ (C → B))→ (C → (A ∧ B)).
Suppose for reductio that G, 0 2 ((C → A) ∧ (C → B))→ (C → (A∧ B)). It
follows that there is an α and Hi such that G ≤ Hi, Hi, α  (C → A)∧ (C →
B), and Hi, α 2 C → (A ∧ B). From the latter we get that there is a β and
Hj such that Hi ≤ Hj , Hj , β  C, and Hj , α ∪ β 2 A ∧ B. From DN1 we
get that Hi, α  C → A, and Hi, α  C → B. Using DN5.1 on each of these
with Hj , β  C, then using DN1 again, we arrive at Hj , α∪β  A∧B, which
gives us our contradiction.
8. Axiom (((A → A) ∧ (B → B))→ C)→ C.
Suppose for reductio that G, 0 2 (((A → A) ∧ (B → B)) → C) → C. Then
there is an α and Hi such that G ≤ Hi, Hi, α  ((A → A) ∧ (B → B))→ C,
and Hi, α 2 C. From Hi, α  ((A → A) ∧ (B → B))→ C, it follows that for
every β and Hj such that Hi ≤ Hj , if Hj , β  (A → A) ∧ (B → B), then
Hj , α ∪ β  C. If we let β = 0 and Hj = Hi (by the reflexivity of ≤), then
we infer that Hi, α  C, which gives us our contradiction.
9. Axiom A → (A ∨ B).
Suppose for reductio that G, 0 2 A → (A ∨ B). Then there is an α and Hi
such that G ≤ Hi, Hi, α  A, and Hi, α 2 A∨B. But then Hi, α 2 A, giving
us our contradiction.
10. Axiom A → (B ∨ A).
Similar to previous case.
11. Axiom ((A → C) ∧ (B → C))→ ((A ∨ B)→ C).
Suppose for reductio that G, 0 2 ((A → C) ∧ (B → C)) → ((A ∨ B) → C).
Then there is a β and Hj such that 0 ≤ Hj , Hj , β  ((A → C) ∧ (B → C)),
but Hj , β 2 ((A ∨ B) → C). From the latter, it follows that there is a γ
and Hk such that Hj ≤ Hk, Hk, γ  (A ∨ B), but Hk, γ ∪ β 2 C. From
Hk, γ  (A ∨ B), either Hk, γ  A or Hk, γ  B. Suppose the former. Using
DN1, it follows that Hj , β  (A → C). Using DN5.1, we may then infer that
Hk, γ ∪ β  C, thus deriving a contradiction.
12. Axiom (A ∧ (B ∨ C))→ ((A ∧ B) ∨ (A ∧ C)).
Suppose for reductio that G, 0 2 (A ∧ (B ∨ C)) → ((A ∧ B) ∨ (A ∧ C)).
Then there is a β and Hi such that 0 ≤ Hi, Hi, β  (A ∧ (B ∨ C)), but
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Hi, β 2 ((A ∧ B) ∨ (A ∧ C)). From the former, we get that Hi, β  A and
Hi, β  (B ∨C). Thus, either Hi, β  B or Hi, β  C. Whether the former or
latter is the case, it follows that Hi, β  ((A∧B) ∨ (A∧ C)), which gives us
a contradiction.
13. Rule (R1).
Assume that G, 0  A → B and that G, 0  A. Given the reflexivity of 0, it
follows from DN5.1 that G, 0  B.
14. Rule (R2).
Proof is trivial given DN1.
The direct negation models are, therefore, models for the logic E.
The main work for modeling negation is done by the valuation conditions
and the idea of pairing worlds together. The idea of arbitrarily assigning
implication formulas arbitrary values at J-worlds appears to be doing work
in preventing formulas such as replacement instances of (A ∧ ∼A) → B
from being valid. This is done by allowing that some H-worlds make both
A → A and its negation true. The arbitrary assignments at J-worlds allow
H-worlds to exist where an implication and its negation are given the value
T or F . Thus, the idea of arbitrary valuations for implicational formulas at
J-worlds is to be used in the completeness proof, which ought to fail; the
negation-free formula for which Urquhart’s positive models fail to invalidate
should also be valid on every direct negation model.
The idea of pairing worlds together to deal with negation can be found
elsewhere in the semantics of relevance logic. For example, consider the
Routley star operator, introduced by both Richard and Valerie Routley in
[26]. In this paper, the Routley star operator is used to create set-ups in
which either two-valued tautologies in ∧,∨, and ∼ fail to hold or contra-
dictions are made to hold. The valuation condition for negation is defined
by ∼A to be in the set up H if and only if A is not in H∗.14 The main
differences between the treatment of negation in the direct negation models
and with Routley star operator are the uniform treatment of the set-ups by
Routley and Routley, the difference between a possible world and a set-up in
terms of the Routley star, and the treatment of the distinguished world G.
For Routley and Routley, there is no guarantee in the models that H = H∗;
however, when H = H∗, they call the set-up H a world due to its complete-
ness and consistency. Further, it is required that G is a world (i.e., G = G∗)
14The operational treatment of De Morgan negation in a distributive lattice — due to
A. Bia lynicki-Birula and H. Rasiowa from 1957 — was known to some relevance logicians
already. See Dunn [6] and [8, §4.3].
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[26, p. 347]. Finally, Routley and Routley do not separate the set-ups into
two classes, unlike the direct negation models.
Another, similar treatment of negation can be found in Restall [23],
wherein four-valued worlds are similarly paired to deal with negation. At
least, that is, the pairing of worlds is used essentially for the treatment of
negated conditionals.
3 From the desk of Robert K. Meyer
Meyer had seen Routley’s manuscript as well as Urquhart’s draft for his
paper [27]. However, Routley’s manuscript mentions — somewhat disparag-
ingly — a ternary relation on page 1. We quote [24, p. 3/2]:
A→ B is in Hα iff for every pair of set-ups Hβ and Hγ which are
R-related to Hα if A is in Hβ then materially B is in Hγ ; in short,
if R(Hα, Hβ, Hγ) and A is in Hβ then B is in Hγ . Canonically
relation R is the following: R(Hα, Hβ, Hγ) iff for every wff B
and C, if B → C is in Hα and B is in Hβ, then C is in Hγ .
But the general implication rule requires special conditions for
practically every pure implicational thesis; so while it is a fine
tool for independence proofs and for systems with weak pure
entailment parts, it considerably complicates first attempts to
prove completeness.
According to Dunn’s recollections, Meyer set out to investigate the pos-
sibility of defining a semantics for R through modeling → from a ternary
relation in early 1971. He distinctly remembers that Meyer was working on
this problem in March 1971, and we know that Urquhart received a copy of
Meyer’s typescript in the summer of that year. Finding a suitable model-
ing of implication and fusion was the missing piece in the semantical puzzle
for relevance logicians at the time. We contend that Meyer’s typescript
contains — with a few small lapses — what later became known as the
Routley–Meyer semantics for relevance logics. In particular, Meyer proves
in some detail two crucial lemmas, one of which is called squeeze lemma (in
later papers), together with a specialized version of it.
Meyer deals with R◦t and its fragments, which is a wise choice, given the
complexities that arise from E→’s not being formalizable by simple types of
proper combinators. R◦t had been algebraized by Dunn in [6] and Meyer
investigated lattice-R in [19].
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Meyer’s manuscript was typed on a typewriter, which likely motivated
certain notational choices. This may also explain why some additions were
inserted as handwritten notes, and of course, there are some crossed out
words and such. The typescript is way more focused and concise than Rout-
ley’s manuscript — it’s a mere eleven pages. We will not follow Meyer’s
notation and will occasionally deviate from his terminology. In order to give
an idea of the main thrust of Meyer’s presentation, we will give semantics




Definition 3.1. A structure for R◦t∧→ is a triple 〈U,R, 0〉, where 0 ∈ U and
R is a ternary relation on U where (c1)–(c7) hold. (Lower case Greek letters
range over elements of U , and we will write Rαβγ — as customary in the
literature — instead of R(α, β, γ).)
c1 R0αα;
c2 Rααα;
c3 Rαβγ iff Rβαγ;
c4 Rαβγ and Rγδ imply that there is an η such that Rαδη and
Rηβ;
c5 Rαβγ and Rγδ imply that there is an η such that Rαη and
Rβδη;
c6 Rαβγ and R0δα imply that Rδβγ;
c7 Rαβγ and R0γδ imply that Rαβδ.15
The set U is a set of situations, which is not empty, because 0 is a
distinguished element. 0 may be thought of as R◦t∧→ itself, which means that
0 is not an arbitrary situation. The additional conditions place restrictions
on the accessibility relation, and they can be seen to correspond to certain
theorems being provable in R◦t∧→ .
Notation. α ≤ β denotes R0αβ.
A more suggestive notation could be R0αβ, which would stress that if
we fix 0, then the ternary relation may be viewed as a binary relation, but
≤ is a quite familiar relation.
15The conditions in (c5) and (c6) are our additions.
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Observation. The relation ≤ is reflexive (due to (c1)) and transitive (due
to (c7)). In other words, ≤ is a quasi-order.
The normal modal logic S4 is sound and complete for structures in which
the accessibility relation is a quasi-order, which may suggest that an S4-like
modality is hiding inside R◦t∧→ . The presence of a quasi-order on the set of
situations suggests a potential connection to intuitionistic logic too.
Definition 3.2. A model for R◦t∧→ is 〈U,R, 0, v〉, where 〈U,R, 0〉 is a structure
for R◦t∧→ , and v is a valuation that maps sentence letters into increasing
subsets of U , that is, ( ↑ ) holds.
↑ If α ≤ β and α ∈ v(p), then β ∈ v(p).
Formulas are evaluated according to (1)–(3). (We use  for truth.)
1 α, v  p iff α ∈ v(p);
2 α, v  A ∧ B iff α, v  A and α, v  B;
3 α, v  A → B iff for any β and γ, if Rαβγ and β, v  A, then
γ, v  B.
Meyer uses the notions of truth and falsity for all formulas — with respect
to a situation, and he would write v(p, α) = T where we have α ∈ v(p).
There is a certain similarity here to the possible-world semantics that was
designed by Kripke for modal logics, and later on, for intuitionistic logic.
Definition 3.3. A formula A is true in a structure when 0, v  A with any
v. A formula A is valid when it is true in every structure for R◦t∧→ .
Both Dunn in [6] and Meyer in [19] allotted considerable attention to R,
and they knew that adding ◦ and t was conservative and a useful move. In
the algebraization of R◦t by Dunn, t and ◦ were used, and in the relational
semantics Meyer used ◦ to define R. We could prove that the semantics
as we have defined it so far gives soundness and completeness, however, we
will follow Meyer’s text more closely by listing the truth conditions for three
more logical components that do not require changing the frame. In other
words, the notions of a structure, a model and truth defined for R◦t∧→ can be
adopted for R◦t+ without modifications.
Definition 3.4. The valuation conditions for other formulas in the language
of Rt◦+ are (4)–(6).
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4 α, v  t iff 0 ≤ α;
5 α, v  A ◦ B iff there are β, γ such that Rβγα and β, v  A and
γ, v  B;
6 α, v  A ∨ B iff α, v  A or α, v  B.
Propositions are sets of possible worlds (modally speaking), and they are
upward-closed sets of situations for R. It may appear that we arbitrarily use
≤ that we already have in the semantics; this impression may be intensified
by the lack of a similar requirement in the operational semantics discussed
in Section 2. However, if α ≤ β (without α = β) is possible, then in the
completeness theorem, where A ∈ α iff α, v  A is proved, α, v  A should
imply β, v  A. The following lemma became a fixture in the literature
on relational semantics (cf. [8, p. 202]) — though Meyer did not prove this
lemma in [20].
Lemma 3.5. For any formula of R◦t+ , if α ≤ β and α, v  A, then β, v  A.
Proof. We use induction on the structure of the formulas. For sentence
letters, the claim is part of the definition of a valuation. For t, β, v  t
follows by the transitivity of ≤ from α, v  t and α ≤ β.
Let us assume that the claim holds for A and B. Then the cases of A∧B
and A ∨ B are straightforward (and omitted). For A → B, let us assume
that α, v  A → B and α ≤ δ. The former implies that γ, v  B is true or
Rαβγ is false or β, v  A does not hold. In the first and third alternatives,
obviously, δ, v  A → B. If Rαβγ fails, then so does Rδβγ by (c6). The
case of A ◦ B uses (c7) in a similar fashion (and we omit its details).
Theorem 3.6. The logic R◦t+ is sound for the class of structures for R◦t∧→ .
Proof. The proof has a familiar structure: it can be shown that all axioms
are valid and the rules preserve validity. We will not include all the details,
because the omitted steps are either routine or can be found elsewhere. As
sample steps, we consider (A1) and (A3).
1. Let us assume that A → A is not valid, that is, in a structure for
R◦t∧→ , with some v, 0, v 2 A → A. By (3) from Definition 3.2, we get that
α, v  A and R0αβ, but β, v 2 A, for some α and β. Lemma 3.5 guarantees
that β, v  A, which is a contradiction.
2. Again, we start with an assumption to the contrary, that is, 0, v 2 (A →
(A → B)) → (A → B). Then R0αβ and α, v  A → (A → B) while
β, v 2 A → B. By Lemma 3.5, α, v 2 A → B, that is, Rαγδ and γ, v  A
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whereas δ, v 2 B, for some γ and δ. The condition that corresponds to (A3)
is Rαγδ implies R(αγ)γδ.16 Meyer’s list does not contain a condition of this
exact shape, but here is how we can get it from (c1)–(c7).
We got above that Rαγδ and (c2) adds Rγγγ to this. That is, we have
Rα(γγ)δ, hence, by (c3), R(γγ)αδ. Having applied (c5) and then (c3) again,
we get R(γα)γδ and R(αγ)γδ. In sum, Rαγδ implies Rαγ and Rγδ, for
some .
From the calculations above, we know that α makes the antecedent of
(A3) true. Then (3) from Definition 3.2 together with what we already have
imply that , v  A → B. Using γ, v  A and Rγδ, we deduce that δ, v  B.
This is a contradiction.
Definition 3.7. A set of formulas T is an intensional theory (ith , for short)
when it is closed under (R2) and (R1) with the major premise being a
provable formula. That is, (1)–(2) hold.
1 If A,B ∈ T, then A ∧ B ∈ T.
2 If A ∈ T and A → B is a theorem, then B ∈ T.
An intensional theory is a prime intensional theory (pith , for short) when
it satisfies (3) in addition to (1) and (2).
3 If A ∨ B ∈ T, then A ∈ T or B ∈ T.
It is useful to have the following definition and lemma ready for later
use. The set of formulas is an operational structure, and we can use ◦ on
ith ’s by applying the connective to formulas that are elements of the ith ’s
and by appealing to theorems (for order).
Definition 3.8. Let α and β be ith ’s. α ◦ β = { C : ∃A ∈ α ∃B ∈ β `
(A ◦ B)→ C }.
Lemma 3.9. If α and β are ith’s, then so is α ◦ β. Furthermore, for any
ith’s α and β, and for any formula C, C ∈ α ◦ β iff there are A ∈ α and
B ∈ β such that ` (A ◦ B)→ C.
Proof. A suitable instance of (A2) guarantees that if ` C → D, then C ∈ α◦β
implies D ∈ α◦β. Let C1 and C2 be elements of α◦β. Then there are A1,B1
and A2,B2 such that ` A1 ◦ B1 → C1 and ` A2 ◦ B2 → C2, where the A’s
are in α, the B’s are in β. Since ith ’s are closed under (R2), A1 ∧ A2 ∈ α,
16Grouping indicates the composition of R with itself as usual. R(αβ)γδ is shorthand
for Rγδ and Rαβ, for some .
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and similarly, B1 ∧ B2 ∈ β. However, ` ((A1 ∧ A2) ◦ (B1 ∧ B2)) → C1 and
` ((A1∧A2) ◦ (B1∧B2))→ C2, hence, ` ((A1∧A2) ◦ (B1∧B2))→ (C1∧C2).
The right-to-left direction of the second claim is simply the definition
of α ◦ β. For the left-to-right direction, we consider rules (R1) and (R2).
Given what we have already said, it is sufficient to note that proofs are finite
sequences of formulas, and (r1) and (r2) are theorems.
r1 ((A ◦ B)→ C)→ ((C → D)→ ((A ◦ B)→ D))
r2 ((A1 ◦ B1)→ C1)→
(
((A2 ◦ B2)→ C2)→
(((A1 ∧ A2) ◦ (B1 ∧ B2))→ (C1 ∧ C2))
)

For the completeness of R◦t∧→ , ith are used, since pith are undefined in
R◦t∧→ . However, for R
◦t
+ and R primeness is needed to ensure that the cus-
tomary clause for disjunction can be used.
Definition 3.10. Let I be the set of ith in R◦t∧→ , and let 0 be the set of
theorems of R◦t∧→ . If α, β and γ are ith ’s, then R holds between them in that
order, that is, Rαβγ iff for all A and B, if A ∈ α and B ∈ β, then A◦B ∈ γ.
Lemma 3.11. The triple 〈I, 0, R〉, as in Definition 3.10, is a structure
for R◦t∧→ .
Proof. We do not include all the details here; rather, we point out that 0 is
closed under (R2) and (R1), that is, 0 ∈ I. The bulk of the proof is to show
that the accessibility relation R satisfies conditions (c1)–(c7). We include
details of showing that (c1), (c3) and (c6) hold.
1. Let us assume that A ∈ α, and B is an arbitrary theorem. Then, by (R3)
t→ B is a theorem too. Furthermore, t→ (A → (B ◦A)) is a theorem, and
by (R5) we also have that (t◦A)→ (B◦A) is a theorem. Also, A → (t◦A)
is a theorem for an arbitrary formula A, hence, t ◦ A ∈ α, because α is an
ith. The transitivity of → (i.e., (A2)) gives that A → (B ◦ A) is a theorem
whenever B itself is a theorem. That is, B ◦ A ∈ α as we intended to show.
2. For (c3), let us assume that A ∈ α and B ∈ β, hence, A ◦ B ∈ γ.
We have the following series of theorems (B ◦ A) → (B ◦ A) (by (A1)),
B → (A → (B◦A)) (by (R6)), (B → (A → (B◦A)))→ (A → (B → (B◦A)))
(by (A4)), A → (B → (B ◦A)) (by (R1)), and finally, (A◦B)→ (B ◦A) (by
(R5)). Then, B ◦ A ∈ γ, as needed.
3. To show that (c6) holds, we assume Rαβγ and R0δα. Let D ∈ δ and
B ∈ β. We note that D → D is a theorem, and so is, for arbitrary A and C,
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((A → C) ◦ A) → C. Then R0δα implies that D ∈ α, but then D ◦ B ∈ γ
using the assumption Rαβγ.
The last component in obtaining the completeness is finding a valuation.
Propositions are sets of situations, in general. Concretely, we want a formula
to be supported by all those ith ’s that contain it.
Definition 3.12. The canonical valuation is u defined by (1) below and
extended according to (1)–(5) from Definitions 3.2 and 3.4.
1 α, u  r iff r ∈ α, where r is a propositional variable p or the
intensional truth t.
Theorem 3.13. (Completeness for R◦t∧→) For any formula A and for
any α ∈ I, α, u  A iff A ∈ α.
Proof. To start with, we note that the claim is true by definition for atomic
formulas. We have three connectives, hence, three cases to consider.
1. Let us assume that the claim holds for A and B. α, u  A ∧ B means
that α, u  A and α, u  B. By the hypothesis, A ∈ α and B ∈ α, and then
A∧B ∈ α, because α is an ith. For the converse, it is sufficient to note that
(A6) and (A7) are theorems. Then, A ∧ B ∈ α yields A,B ∈ α, because α
is an ith. The inductive hypothesis gives α, u  A and α, u  B, that is,
α, u  A ∧ B.
2. Our assumption for this case is the same. If α, u 2 A → B, then for
some β and γ, Rαβγ and β, u  A but γ, u 2 B. By hypothesis, A ∈ β
and B /∈ γ. Let C ∈ α, hence, C ◦ A ∈ γ. If A → B were an element
of the ith α, then instantiating C, (A → B) ◦ A would be in γ. However,
((A → B) ◦ A) → B is a theorem, and then B must have been in γ leading
to a contradiction. Therefore, A → B /∈ α. To prove the other half, let us
suppose that A → B /∈ α. We will consider two sets of formulas in place of
the ith ’s we need. Let β be the ith generated by A. To find a suitable γ,
we consider α ◦ β. Clearly, Rαβγ. To see that B ∈ γ is impossible, let us
assume that it is the case. Then, there is a C ∈ α such that ` (C ◦ A)→ B,
which means that ` C → (A → B). However, α is an ith, and A → B /∈ α.
Since B /∈ γ, we get that α, u 2 A → B.
3. Once again, we assume that the claim holds for the immediate proper
subformulas of A ◦ B. Let α, u  A ◦ B, that is, β, u  A and γ, u  B for
some β, γ such that Rβγα. Since A ∈ β and B ∈ γ, the definition of R gives
that A ◦ B ∈ α. For the other direction, we start by assuming the latter.
We must find a pair of ith ’s that can be taken in the places of β and γ. Let
β be the ith generated by A, that is, β = { C : ` A → C }. Similarly, let γ
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be generated by B. We note that (A18) guarantees closure under rule (R2).
The tonicity property of ◦ with respect to provable → makes sure that for
all C ∈ β and for all D ∈ γ, C ◦D ∈ α. This means that Rβγα holds, hence,
α, u  A ◦ B, as we wanted to show.
Meyer considered the completeness for R◦t∧→ separately, because the claim
we just proved cannot be proved for formulas of the form A∨B. The reason
is that any formula generates its own ith, which however, will not include
any formulas that are distinct from the given formula while they imply the
given formula. If A and B are distinct, and (A ∨ B)→ A and (A ∨ B)→ B
are not theorems, then the ith generated by A ∨ B contains the formula
itself, but does not contain either A or B. This is the reason to change
Definition 3.10.
Definition 3.14. Let I′ be the set of pith in R◦t+ , and let 0 be the set of
theorems of R◦t+ . If α, β and γ are pith ’s, then R holds between them in
that order, that is, Rαβγ iff for all A and B, if A ∈ α and B ∈ β, then
A ◦ B ∈ γ.
Now we have to prove anew that 〈I′, R, 0〉 is a structure for R◦t∧→ (hence,
for R◦t+ too) in the sense of Definition 3.1. The conditions that appear to be
the most difficult to prove are (c4) and (c5), because in each, a suitable pith
has to be found. Meyer’s strategy is to prove two lemmas, which are useful
in several places in the completeness proof. Indeed, they capture significant
insights about the algebras of R◦t∧→ and R
◦t
+ .
Lemma 3.15. If α is an ith, and B is a formula, then let αuB be the least
ith such that α ∪ {B } ⊆ αuB. For any C ∈ αuB, there is an A ∈ α such
that ` (A ∧ B)→ C.
Proof. The cases when C ∈ α, or C is B are obvious. We have to make sure
that the claim is inherited through finitely many applications of the rules
that constitute the closure conditions on ith ’s.
1. Let ` C1 → C2 whereas C1 ∈ αuB. By hypothesis, ` (A ∧ B) → C1, and
by an instance of (A2) and the definition of ith, ` (A ∧ B)→ C2.
2. If C1, C2 ∈ αuB, then ` (A1 ∧ B) → C1 as well as ` (A2 ∧ B) → C2.
Using axioms (A6)–(A8) together with the transitivity of →, that is, (A2),
we obtain that ` (A1∧A2∧B)→ C1 and ` (A1∧A2∧B)→ C2. Then, (A8)
gives ` (A1 ∧A2 ∧B)→ (C1 ∧C2). Of course, we assumed that the A’s were
in α, hence, A1 ∧ A2 ∈ α too.
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Lemma 3.16. (Squeeze lemma) If α◦β ⊆ γ, where α, β ∈ I and γ ∈ I′,
then there is an α′ ∈ I′ such that α ⊆ α′ and α′ ◦ β ⊆ γ.
Proof. First of all, note that even if ◦ were not commutative, all the steps in
the proof would show the truth of the claim with α and β interchanged. Of
course, for R this observation is unimportant, but it opens up the possibility
of adapting the semantics to other logics, notably, to E.
Let A = { δ ∈ I : α ⊆ δ ∧ δ ◦ β ⊆ γ }.17 A 6= ∅, because α ∈ A. The
union of a chain (with respect to ⊆) from A is an element of A and an upper
bound for the chain. Hence, by Zorn’s lemma, there is a maximal element
in A.
The point of getting a maximal (within A) ith is that it can be shown
to be prime. Let’s assume that for some A1 and A2, (αuA1) ◦ β * γ, and
(αuA2) ◦ β * γ. By Lemma 3.9, there are C1 ∈ αuA1, C2 ∈ αuA2 and
B1,B2 ∈ β such that C1 ◦ B1 /∈ γ and C2 ◦ B2 /∈ γ. Let B be the conjunction
of the B’s; then, C1 ◦ B /∈ γ, C2 ◦ B /∈ γ. By Lemma 3.15, we know that
there are D1 and D2 such that ` A1 ∧ D1 → C1 and ` A2 ∧ D2 → C2. Let
D be the conjunction of the D’s. Combining all the formulas we have, we
get that (A1 ∧ D) ◦ B /∈ γ, neither is (A2 ∧ D) ◦ B ∈ γ. γ is a pith , thus,
((A1 ∧ D) ◦ B) ∨ ((A2 ∧ D) ◦ B) /∈ γ either. However, there are pleasing
interactions between the connectives in R◦t+ ; in particular, ` (((A1 ∧ D) ∨
(A2∧D))◦B)→ (((A1∧D)◦B)∨((A2∧D)◦B)) and ` (((A1∨A2)∧D)◦B)→
(((A1∧D)∨ (A2∧D))◦B). Since (((A1∨A2)∧D)◦B) /∈ γ, we can conclude
that A1 ∨ A2 /∈ δ.
The squeeze lemma is useful not only in the proof of the next lemma,
but also in the proof of the completeness theorem.
Lemma 3.17. The triple 〈I′, R, 0〉 is a structure for R◦t+ .
Proof. The set of theorems of R◦t+ is a pith . An easy way to prove this (and
we omit the details) is by using the sequent calculus LR+ from Dunn [7].
18
The bulk of the proof is to show that R defined as before but restricted to
I′ has the properties captured by (c1)–(c7). Informally speaking, the crux
is whether there are sufficiently many pith ’s of the desired shape. That is,
we are interested not merely in the cardinal number for I′, but we want to
have pith ’s to be nicely dispersed. We consider (c2) and (c4) in some detail,
and leave the other conditions for the reader to check.
17Meyer considers a larger set of ith ’s in the proof by omitting the inclusion of α
into δ.
18Dunn presented LR+ at a conference in 1969. This sequent calculus is one of the
justifications Meyer gives for 0 being a pith — together with a result of his own.
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1. Let us assume that A,B ∈ α. Then B → (A ◦ B) ∈ α, because α ∈ I′
and ` A → (B → (A ◦ B)). Also, B ∧ (B → (A ◦ B)) ∈ α. Another theorem
of R◦t+ , (B∧ (B → (A◦B)))→ (A◦B) guarantees that A◦B ∈ α, as desired.
2. For (c4), let us assume both Rαβγ and Rγδ. Let A ∈ α, B ∈ β and
D ∈ δ. R(α◦δ)β, because — using our arbitrary formulas — (A◦B)◦D ∈ ,
but ` ((A ◦ B) ◦ D)→ ((A ◦D) ◦ B). By Lemma 3.9, α ◦ δ is an ith, and by
the Squeeze Lemma, there is a pith η such that Rηβ and α ◦ δ ⊆ η. Such
an η, by its construction, possesses the property that Rαδη holds of it.
Before we turn to proving completeness, it is useful to single out another
lemma, which captures a deep insight into what sorts of ith are pith .
Lemma 3.18. If α is an ith with the property that A /∈ α, then there is a
pith γ that extends α without including A.
Proof. We maximize α, and then we show that the resulting ith is a pith .
Let E be {β : α ⊆ β ∧ β ∈ I ∧ A /∈ β }. Obviously, α ∈ E, and the union
of non-empty chains is an upper bound in E. Let γ be a maximal element
in E, by Zorn’s lemma. To show primeness, we argue that if B /∈ γ and
C /∈ γ, then neither is B ∨ C ∈ γ. There are D1 and D2 in α such that
` (D1 ∧ B) → A and ` (D2 ∧ C) → A. We denote D1 ∧ D2 by D; D ∈ α,
because α is an ith. Then, (D ∧B)→ (D1 ∧ B) and similarly, for D2 and C.
By suffixing and detachment, ` (D ∧ B) → A and ` (D ∧ C) → A. Using
(R2), the distribution of → and ∧ over ∨, we get that ` (D∧ (C ∨B))→ A.
This implies that B ∨ C /∈ γ either.
Theorem 3.19. (Completeness for R◦t+ ) If 0, v  A in any structure
for R◦t+ under any valuation v, then A is a theorem of R◦t+ .
Proof. We use the triple 〈I′, R, 0〉 together with the earlier definition of the
canonical valuation (where α is a variable running over I′ now). The cases
for atomic formulas are as before; the cases for ∧ and ∨ are easy. We consider
in some detail the cases for the two other connectives.
1. Let us consider A → B. The first half of step 2 in the proof of Theo-
rem 3.13 stands as before. The second half requires some addition, namely,
β and γ as defined there do not need to be pith ’s. However, we have estab-
lished that Rαβγ holds, while B /∈ γ. We appeal to Lemma 3.18, that is, to
maximizing γ on the condition that B /∈ γ, which yields a pith , let’s say, γ′.
γ ⊆ γ′ ensures that Rαβγ′ holds too. Then, by the Squeeze Lemma, there
is a pith β′ such that Rαβ′γ′.
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2. The situation is similar, though slightly simpler, for A◦B. The first half
of step 3 in the same proof requires two applications of the Squeeze Lemma
to obtain the pith ’s β′ and γ′ from β and γ, respectively, with Rβ′γ′α.
This completes the proof of the completeness theorem for R◦t+ .
Section X of Meyer’s typescript takes care of negation. He opts for an
operational modeling of ∼. Dunn in his [6] gave a series of set-theoretic
representations for De Morgan lattices — the algebraic equivalents of fde,
first-degree entailments that are a common fragment of some of the most
notable relevance logics B, T, E and R (but not of linear logic LL). The
operational representation, originally due to Bia lynicki-Birula and Rasiowa,
was certainly known to Meyer, who in fact, used ∗ for the operation. For
fde, little needs to be postulated about ∗, namely, that it’s an involution.
However, in R, there is an interplay between → and ∼, because of one or
another form of contraposition. In the axiomatization we gave in Section 1,
it is expressed by (A15). Meyer included a condition — the one that is most
frequently recited today — that suffices for soundness.
Definition 3.20. A structure for R◦t is 〈U,R,Z, ∗〉, where (c2)–(c7) from
Definition 3.1 hold together with (c1′) and (c8)–(c9).
c1′ For all α, there is a z ∈ Z for which Rzαα holds;
c8 α∗∗ = α;
c9 Rαβγ iff Rαγ∗β∗.
Meyer omitted 0 or Z altogether from his definition by including instead
the choice of a suitable 0 into the refutation of a non-theorem in the proof
of the completeness theorem. He went on to discuss how the admissibility
of the rule γ proved in [21] guaranteed the existence of a suitable 0.
Remark 3.21. We list here what is affected by Z taking the place of 0.
The notation ≤ is defined by existentially quantifying over elements of
Z, that is, α ≤ β iff ∃z ∈ Z Rzαβ.
The satisfiability clause (4) from Definition 3.4 is similarly weakened.
4′ α, v  t iff ∃z ∈ Z z ≤ α.
Lemma 3.5 holds for all formulas of R◦t. We quickly show that it’s true for
∼A. If α  ∼A and α ≤ β, then α∗ 2 A (by (7) below). Also, by (c9),
β∗ ≤ α∗ and using the inductive hypothesis, β∗ 2 A, which is to say that
β  ∼A, as desired.
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For R◦t∧→ or R
◦t
+ , we could adopt Z easily, because in those logics Z =
{ z : 0 ≤ z }, moreover, 0 ∈ Z.
Definition 3.22. A model for R◦t is 〈U,R,Z, ∗, v〉, with (↑) true (from
Definition 3.2), and with formulas evaluated according to (1)–(6) from Def-
initions 3.2 and 3.4, and (7) below.
7 α, v  ∼A iff α∗, v 2 A.
Theorem 3.23. If A is a theorem of R◦t, then in any model for R◦t,
under any valuation v, z, v  A, when z ∈ Z.
Proof. The majority of the cases is as before. We give a sample case in
some detail. Let z /∈ (A → ∼A) → ∼A, that is, α  A → ∼A, β 2 ∼A
while Rzαβ for some α and β. Since α ≤ β, we may use α 2 ∼A, which
yields α∗  A. By (c2), we have that Rα∗α∗α∗, hence, by (c8)–(c9), Rα∗αα.
Further, a suitable instance of (c3) gives Rαα∗α. Then α  A → ∼A means
that α  ∼A, that is, α∗ 2 A. From the contradiction, we infer that axiom
(A14) is valid.
For the completeness, Meyer defined a triple 〈I′, R, ∗〉 and showed that
for any non-theorem a suitable 0 (in his notation) may be found. We instead
consider the union of all clusters of non-theorems (to use his terminology),
that is, a Z (using the notation from [12]).
Definition 3.24. Let I′ be the set of pith in R◦t, and let Z be the set of
pith ’s that contain all the theorems of R◦t. The definition of R is as in
Definition 3.14. If α ∈ I′, then α∗ = {A : ∼A /∈ α }.
Lemma 3.25. The four-tuple 〈I′, R, Z, ∗〉 is a structure for R◦t.
Proof. This proof can incorporate what has already been established for
R◦t∧→ . Additionally, it has to be established that the modified (c1
′) holds
together with the new conditions (c8)–(c9). It also has to be proved that ∗
produces a pith from a pith . We omit all the details here.
The last section in [20] is devoted to showing that there is a suitable
valuation on the structure in the four-tuple.
Theorem 3.26. (Completeness for R◦t) If A is valid in all structures
for R◦t, then A is a theorem of R◦t.
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Proof. The valuation that we want to use is the one in Definition 3.12. We
will limit ourselves to showing that α, u  ∼A iff ∼A ∈ α. The other cases
are similar to cases for R◦t+ . We give a series of iff’s, with the middle iff
justified by the inductive hypothesis; the others come from definitions.
∼A ∈ α iff A /∈ α∗ iff α∗, u 2 A iff α, u  ∼A 
We started this section with a quote from Routley’s manuscript. It
seems that Routley was correct in his assessment that the ternary relational
approach would require conditions characterizing the relation itself to obtain
a semantics for the various relevance logics. Of course, we may point out
that the operational approach contains similar complications in the form of
new entities and various principles. It seems to us that Meyer’s typescript is
much closer to the “Routley–Meyer semantics” than Routley’s manuscript
is. Although Meyer missed some conditions, he recognized the importance
of pith ’s (possibly, having been influenced by algebraic studies of relevance
logics), and he formulated and proved crucial lemmas. His work, at least in
spirit, is a continuation of the Jo´nsson–Tarski approach to the representation
of Boolean algebras with operators, and Kripke’s semantics for normal modal
and intuitionistic logics. In retrospect, generalized Galois logics (i.e., gaggle
theory) might provide the rationale why the ternary relational approach
proved to be more successful than the various semi-lattice-based semantics.19
4 Conclusions
Routley’s manuscript is clearly pioneering; it has a broad scope and is
rich with ideas. Meyer starts his typescript with acknowledgments, which
likely refer to Urquhart’s draft of his operational semantics and to Routley’s
manuscript. (The typescript does not include a list of references or pointers
to concrete writings.) He claims that Dunn and he have shown that the
operational semantics (with the usual clause, like (6) above) cannot be ex-
tended to a semantics for R (or even R+). The full appreciation of this fact
and its consequences for attempts to give a semantics for R must have been
the decisive motive to design a semantics using a ternary relation.
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